



## DNSSEC Policy and Practice Statement

Interoperability Documentation Version: 2023-1-27

## Punto 2012 SAPI de CV



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# | Introduction

## I.1 Overview

The purpose of this document is to enable stakeholders to determine the level of trust they wish to grant to PUNTO 2012 and its back-end Registry Services Provider, Tucows Registry Services (Tucows) DNSSEC management. This document details the policies and procedures employed by [Registry Operator] for each of the TLD zones it operates, mainly the new gTLDs .bar and .rest.

This document conforms to the IETF Internet draft describing DNSSEC Policy (DP) and DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) documents [RFC-6841]. It also draws from the DPS documents published by others and attempts to follow its general structure.

The scope of this document includes provisions for the generation, management, application, and rollover of DNSSEC keying material, with accompanying processes for the proper maintenance of signed zones and availability of public keys for validation of the signed data, for the purpose of providing secure, reliable, correct deployment of signed DNS records in accord with the DNSSEC standards for TLD zones within the responsibility of Tucows as registry services provider.

## I.2 Document Name and Identification

DNSSEC Policy and Practice Statement Version: 2023-09-01, published on 2023-09-01 (abbreviated as "DPS" from here on).

## I.3 Community and Applicability

The target communities for this document include:

- authors and users of applications throughout the public Internet using DNSSEC validation, with a need to evaluate the level of trust to apply to Registry Operator Punto 2012 and their child domains;
- registrars and registrants of domains in .bar and .rest TLDs;
- relying parties intending to use this DNSSEC data to configure trust anchors;
- and reviewers and auditors interested in comparing operations with the policies and processes described here.

The roles and responsibilities for each stakeholder is described as follows:

**Registry:** All zones in the TLDs **.bar** and **.rest** are covered by this document .

It is the responsibility of the registry to sign those zones and make their public keys available to the general public. The registry also enables its registrants to submit the public keys of their child zones in the form of Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Records that are passed by the Registrar through the use of either the appropriate EPP extension as defined in [RFC-5910] or more current; or via a secure web management interface.

These are then included in the signed parent zone.

**Registrar:** The registrar for a child zone is responsible for securely collecting, verifying and passing the DS records from the Registrant to the Registry using either the EPP extension specified in [RFC-5910] or a secure web management interface. This includes authentication that the party submitting the keying material for a given zone is the party responsible for the zone.

**Registrant:** The Registrant must ensure proper DNSSEC data has been submitted to the Registrar to allow for the trust anchors to be inserted in the parent zone.

**Relying Party:** Public key material published by .bar and .rest as a trust anchor can be used by anyone interested in using the signed zones as secure entry points for DNSSEC. The relying party needs to ensure that it is using the current trust anchors, in accordance with the Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) which will be included at the top of each trust anchor file.

## **I.4 Specification Administration**

### **I.4.1 Specification Administration Organization**

Tucows Registry is the authority for execution and any change to the policies and procedures discussed in this document.

### **I.4.2 Contact information**

The point of contact for all aspects of Registry Operations under the responsibility of .bar and .rest TLDs are:

**Phone: +(52) 558589-8544**

**Email: [privacy@punto2012.com](mailto:privacy@punto2012.com)**

**<https://www.punto2012.com/privacy>**

### **I.4.3 Specification Change Procedures**

This DPS will be periodically reviewed and updated, as appropriate according to factors that include:

**Environmental Changes:** Identification of relevant changes in the business, technological, operational or regulatory environment.

**Results of Compliance Audits:** Whenever the results of a compliance audit highlights improvements to either Policy or Operational aspects of this DPS.

**Periodic Review:** As the result of a periodic review of the general policy.

#### **I44 Specification Administration Organization**

Changes to the DPS are drafted, reviewed and approved by the management. Application of the DPS is the responsibility of the Direction of Registry Operations managed by the back-end registry services provider: TUCOWS.

Any change to the DPS needs to be approved by a management representative of Tucows Registry, Director of Registry Operations.

The point of contact for this organization is as follows:

Tucows  
96 Mowat Avenue  
Toronto  
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Phone: Phone: +1 (416) 535-0123  
Email: [ry-services@tucows.com](mailto:ry-services@tucows.com)

The mechanism to communicate changes in the DPS will be decided on a case by case basis, considering the impact on the stakeholder community and the nature of the changes themselves.

## 2 Publication and Repositories

### 21 Repositories

Information on the DNSSEC keys used to sign the zones for which the Tucows systems are authoritative is provided via a TLS secured website. The specific URL to the repository will be linked from the Tucows public home page.

### 22 Publication of Public Keys

Tucows will publish its Key Signing Keys in two formats.

**Trust Anchor Format:** This format can be directly included into a BIND resolver as a trust-anchor. It is equal to the specification of the DNSKEY resource record except for the TTL and class parameters, which are intentionally left out.

**Delegation Signer (DS) Format:** In this format, the public key is presented in a hash representation according to the DS Resource Record specification. There is no TTL or class parameter provided in this format.

### 221 Access Controls on Repositories

All keys are available with PGP signatures generated with the current Tucows key. Validation of both the X.509 TLS certificate of the website as well as the PGP signature of the trust-anchor files is recommended. The PGP key will be signed by Tucows as the responsible party; signatories will be senior personnel for easy validation.



## 3 Operational Requirements

### 3.1 Registration of delegation signer (DS) resource records

The gTLD zones maintained by Tucows follow a thick registry model. The Registrar is responsible for collecting the required DNSSEC data from the Registrant, to be used in the parent zone by the Registry.

Tucows is responsible for the correct, timely generation of signed DNS data and for distributing it to DNS service providers for its zones.

### 3.2 Method to prove possession of private key

The Registrant is entirely and solely responsible for the correctness of the submitted key material.

### 3.3 Removal of DS resource records

The Registrar is responsible for receiving and processing the request to remove DS resource records from the Registrant. This information is then transmitted to Tucows for execution.

Removed DS records are removed from the active Registry database but might remain for an undefined time in backups or logging systems.

#### 3.3.1 Who can request removal

The Registrant may contact the Registrar and request removal of the DS resource records via the regular channels set forth by the Registrar for this purpose.

#### 3.3.2 Emergency removal request

Invalid DS keys may be removed from the DNS or the Registry database by Tucows.

All changes to the Registry information happen in near real time, so the process for Emergency requests is the same as for regular requests.

## 4 Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

### 4.1 Physical controls

#### 4.1.1 Site location and construction

Tucows operates multiple data center sites in continental USA, Canada and Europe. These are all in secured cabinets in datacenters for hot and backup operations. The operations described here will make use of all of those facilities for housing and running the specialized hardware as well as for supporting the management processes.

#### 4.1.2 Physical access

As per Tucows Security Policy, all the facilities providing DNSSEC-related services have restricted access, limited to authorized personnel. Specific measures depend on the facility and the level of access required, and may include smartcards, biometrics, and other methods for access control by Tucows, its contractors or third-party data center operators.

#### 4.1.3 Power and air conditioning

All facilities have Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) capabilities and air conditioning. The external data center sites have redundant systems in place in the event of a power failure.

#### 4.1.4 Water exposures

To avoid the risk of water exposure, all Tucows facilities are on elevated floors. Data bearing facilities require evidence of proper water controls along with other environmental controls discussed in this document.

#### 4.1.5 Fire prevention and protection

All facilities have fire detectors and gas extinguishers.

#### **4.1.6 Media storage –**

Specific measures depend on the security classification of data involved, but all sensitive media is stored in data center which is only accessible by Tucows Senior Management and specifically designated contractor personnel.

#### **4.1.7 Media & Waste disposal**

Sensitive documents and materials are shredded before disposal. Media used to collect or transmit sensitive information is rendered unreadable before disposal.

Smart cards are shredded and burned prior to disposal.

#### **4.1.8 Off-site backup**

System software and applications configuration are backed-up to storage systems spread across multiple data centers.

For purposes of recovery from disaster in which all HSMs at all sites fail, material needed to reconstitute an uninitialized HSM is also backed up. All private key backups are encrypted with an internal HSM key, which is backed up separately at HSM initialization time. For both the KSK and the ZSK, these backups are in the form of smart cards kept at a secure off-site facility. All private key backups are encrypted with an internal HSM key, which is backed up separately.

### **4.2 Procedural controls**

#### **4.2.1 Trusted roles**

Activation data needed to make use of the private keys inside the HSMs is split into smart cards controlled by multiple key Tucows individuals.

#### **4.2.2 Number of persons required per task**

One key person in the possession of his or her smart card must be present and enrolled in the HSM in order to perform any signing operation.

Change of keys require the use of an additional *admin* smart card that enables these operations.

## **43 Personnel controls**

### **43.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements**

Engineers taking part in the Trusted Roles have to have been working for the company for no less than one year and must have the qualifications necessary for the role they have been appointed to.

Managers taking part in the Trusted Roles need to have been working for the company for no less than a year.

### **43.2 Training requirements**

Before an individual is issued a security card, he or she must observe one regular key roll over process. There can be any number of observers for any given regular key roll over process.

### **43.3 Contracting personnel requirements**

No person outside of the specified Trusted Roles can get access to the signer systems. If necessary, a team can perform certain tasks with the guidance of an external contractor. At no time is the contractor allowed to be the person performing the tasks on the system.

### **43.4 Documentation supplied to personnel**

The regular procedures for backup and restore are available to all personnel involved. If major alterations to those procedures are made, the engineers of those teams will be informed accordingly.

## **44 Audit logging procedures**

### **44.1 Types of events recorded**

Physical access to the facilities used for our signing systems is logged automatically on enter and exit. The main operation site requires personnel to be specifically granted permission to enter the suite in which the equipment is located and they will have to sign-in using a valid identification (passport, drivers license, etc.).

Log messages from the signer systems will be sent securely to a logging system and recorded for audit purposes.

#### **442 Protection of audit log**

Audit logs of our main operation site are kept by an external data center operator. These logs are not available to any of our employees and cannot be modified at the request of any of our employees.

#### **45 Compromise and disaster recovery**

Any relevant events relating to the secure operation of our systems will be announced through the appropriate channels at the time. Tucows and its contractors will invoke the relevant plans, including operations as described above and communications, in accordance with industry best practice.

##### **45.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures**

If an event leads to, or could lead to, a detected security compromise, we will perform an investigation to determine the nature of the incident. If we suspect the incident has compromised the private component of an active key, an emergency key roll-over procedure will be performed.

##### **45.2 Entity private key compromise procedures**

Upon the suspected or known compromise of a key, we will assess the situation, develop an action plan and implement the action plan with approval from the Information Security Officer and Senior Management. When we perform an emergency roll-over for a compromised KSK, we will continue to operate this key for at least the minimum time specified to retrieve our public key trust anchors in the AUP.

## 5 Technical Security Controls

### 5.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

#### 5.1.1 Key Pair Generation

Both the Key Signing Key (KSK) and Zone Signing Key (ZSK) are generated via HSM in the signer systems. Parameters such as key length and cryptographic algorithm are set in accordance with Best Current Practice in similar systems and will be updated from time to time as appropriate.

#### 5.1.2 Public Key Delivery

The public key is retrieved from the signer system and then published as detailed in the section Publication and Repositories on page 4. The process employs cryptographic protections to insure the integrity of the public key, as explained in the Security Policy for this level of classification.

#### 5.1.3 Key Usage Purposes

A key must only be used for one zone and cannot be reused.

### 5.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

#### 5.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

Tucows employs HSMs with at least the following certifications:

- FIPS 140-2 Level 3
- Common Criteria EAL 4+
- Robust tamper-resistant hardware protecting key material even when archived.
- Strong authentication of administrators and dual controls through the use of advanced quorum techniques to mitigate the threat of single “super users”.
- Advanced separation of duties of key management activities between DNS,IT and security administrators to facilitate regulatory compliance.

- Centralized key management to support multiple DNS servers.
- Scalability to add HSMs dynamically and balance load as capacity requirements increase.
- High availability and disaster recovery with unlimited secure key backup and retrieval.
- Cryptographic CPU offloading to improve DNS server performance.

## **5.2.2 Private Key Backup**

For purposes of disaster recovery in which all HSMs at all sites fail, material needed to reconstitute an uninitialized HSM is backed up. All private key backups are encrypted with an internal HSM key, which is backed up separately at HSM initialization time.

For both the KSK and the ZSK, these backups are in the form of smart cards kept at a secure off-site facility.

Key material is securely transferred among HSMs, which provides resilient storage. The private key will also be stored into smart cards. Access to the backups in any form requires authorization from Senior Management.

## **5.2.3 Method of Activating Private Key**

Activation data needed to make use of the private keys inside the HSMs is split into smart cards controlled by multiple corporate officers and operations staff.

Cards are to be stored in tamper evident containers by each user. Guidelines on initialization and handling of smart cards are based on manufacturer's instructions for the HSMs and best practices used in support of DNSSEC elsewhere, including the root zone.

Key activation requires the use of smart cards.

## **5.2.4 Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module**

Private keys can only be transferred off the system in encrypted form and restored to the back-up system by the teams described in the Trusted Roles section, as explained in the Key Backup section above.

## **5.25 Method of Destroying Private Key**

Tucows uses The HSM's provided functionality for the secure destruction of all key material.

Defective smart cards are retained until the keys they secure have been phased out. Then they are disposed of according to this policy.

## **5.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management**

Tucows will only publish the public keys currently relevant to the operation of its zones. No archive of public keys past their revocation is available.

Past or revoked key pairs are destroyed and not archived.

## **5.4 Computer Security Controls**

Tucows ensures that the systems maintaining key software and data files are Trustworthy Systems secure from unauthorized access. In addition, Tucows limits access to production servers to those individuals with a valid business reason for such access. General application users do not have accounts on production servers. All this follows the current Security Policy.

## **5.5 Network Security Controls**

Systems holding the signing infrastructure are inside a dedicated VLAN inside our network infrastructure. The only communications channel to those systems is through firewalls, which are limited to the minimal capabilities necessary for the operation of the system.

## **5.6 Timestamping**

The signer systems securely synchronize their system clocks with a trusted time sources inside and outside our network.



## **5.7 Life Cycle Technical Controls**

### **5.7.1 System Development Controls**

As explained above, the signer systems employ ISC's BIND 9 or BIND 10 interfacing with HSMs that provide secure storage and processing involving private key material.

Only production-ready versions of BIND 9 or BIND 10 as well as the HSMs are used for Tucows, after thorough testing in our OT&E platform.

## 6 Zone Signing

### 6.1 Key Lengths, Key Types, and Algorithms

Tucows utilizes key lengths, types and algorithms considered as best practices at the time.

Currently, the DNSSEC system for Tucows TLDs will use 2048-bit RSA KSKs and 1024-bit RSA ZSKs. The signature algorithm will be RSA-encrypted SHA-256 hashes as per [RFC-4509].

### 6.2 Authenticated Denial of Existence

Tucows uses NSEC [RFC-4034] to authenticate denial of existence of resource records.

### 6.3 Signature Format

The signatures will be RSA encrypted with SHA-256 hashes.

### 6.4 Key rollover

ZSKs are rolled over quarterly, with each ZSK cycle lasting ninety (90) days plus rollover time. They are published ten (10) days before use and remain published ten (10) days after the new key is in use for signing, to account for cached entries in the DNS and to facilitate rollover.

KSKs are rolled approximately every two to five years as appropriate, such as when there is a change in Best Common Practice for signature algorithms or parameters or the current key is believed to be compromised, HSM upgrade or replacement, or to exercise rollover mechanisms. New KSKs are propagated into the root as part of the regular KSK exchanges with ICANN.

A new KSK is published in the zone 60 days prior to use and remains published 20 days after it is no longer used to sign.

The timing of KSK rollovers is chosen to center around normal quarterly ZSK rollover cycles to limit the size of the DNSKEY RR set to no more than three (3) keys at any one time (i.e., old KSK, new KSK and current ZSK). Furthermore, only the KS signatures over the DNSKEY RR set will be generated. These measures keep root zone referral response packet sizes as small as possible.

## 65 Signature Lifetime and Re-Signing Frequency

The RRSIG resource record in all zones under Tucows management has a lifetime of less than one day. Zones can be resigned every 5 minutes to 30 minutes depending on various external factors.

## 66 Verification of Resource Records

Tucows operates monitoring systems that check DNSSEC signature validity. Alarms are raised when anomalies are detected.

## 67 Resource Records Time-to-Live

RR	Time-to-Live
<b>DNSKEY</b>	Equal to the TTL used for the SOA record
<b>NSEC</b>	Equal to the TTL used for the SOA record
<b>RRSIG</b>	Equal to the lowest TTL of the record set covered
<b>DS</b>	Equal to the TTL of the NS record set

## **7 Compliance Audit**

### **7.1 Frequency of Entity Compliance Audit**

Every two years after the complete implementation of this DPS, a Compliance Audit will be performed to verify that practices remain compliant with the contents and intent of the DPS.

### **7.2 Identity and Qualifications of Auditor**

The Compliance Audit will be performed by an independent entity with qualifications and experience with DNSSEC operations.

### **7.3 Auditor's Relationship to Audited Party**

The selected auditor must not have commercial ties to Tucows or any of its related companies.

### **7.4 Topics Covered by Audit**

The scope of the audit will focus on compliance with the DPS and its alignment with current industry best practices.

### **7.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency**

Deficiencies or gaps in compliance with the DPS or deviations from the current industry best practices are to be collected in a findings reports that will be delivered to Tucows and ISC's management teams, who will assess and prioritize any findings and respond promptly with an action plan to bring the identified issues to resolution.

### **7.6 Communication of Results**

The communication of the findings and action plans will be decided on a case by case basis by the respective management teams, considering safeguarding the stability of the DNS as well as best interests of all stakeholders.

## **8 Legal Matters**

### **8.1 Fees**

No fees are charged for any function related to DNSSEC.

### **8.2 Financial Responsibility**

Tucows and its agents accept no financial responsibility for improper use of Trust Anchors or signatures or any other improper use under this DPS.

### **8.3 Term and Termination**

This DPS applies until further notice. This DPS may be amended from time to time and it is in force until it is replaced by a new version.

### **8.4 Limitations of Liability**

Neither Tucows, DHH, nor their agents shall be liable for any financial loss, or loss arising from incidental damage or impairment, resulting from its performance of its obligations hereunder. No other liability, implicit or explicit, is accepted.

### **8.5 Dispute Resolution Provisions**

Disputes among DNSSEC participants shall be resolved pursuant to provisions in the applicable agreements among the parties.

### **8.6 Governing Law**

This DPS shall be governed by the laws of Los Angeles, California.

## References

- [RFC-4034] R. Arends et al. *Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions*. RFC 4034 (Proposed Standard). Updated by RFCs 4470, 6014, 6840,6944. Internet Engineering Task Force, Mar. 2005. url: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4034.txt>(cit. on p. 14).
- [RFC-4509] W. Hardaker. *Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS)Resource Records (RRs)*. RFC 4509 (Proposed Standard). Internet Engineering Task Force, May 2006. url: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4509.txt>(cit. on p. 14).
- [RFC-5910] J. Gould and S. Hollenbeck. *Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)*. RFC 5910 (Proposed Standard). Internet Engineering Task Force, May2010. url: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5910.txt>(cit. on p. 2).
- [RFC-6841] F. Ljunggren, AM. Eklund Lowinder, and T. Okubo. *A Framework for DNSSEC Policies and DNSSEC Practice Statements*. RFC 6841 (Informational). Internet Engineering Task Force, Jan. 2013. url: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6841.txt> (cit. on p. 1).